How India Can Build Global Manufacturing Influence in a Decade

Procurement teams abroad rarely add an Indian supplier because India is big. They add one because they want a second source. That small difference explains most of what India has and hasn’t achieved in manufacturing over the last decade.
Make in India launched in 2014 with a target of lifting manufacturing to 25 percent of GDP. The share has stayed in the mid-teens. Meanwhile the country has built real strengths. It assembles a meaningful slice of the world’s smartphones, supplies a large share of generic medicines, and ships auto components to nearly every major carmaker. Yet none of this has given India the kind of influence that China, or even Taiwan and South Korea, hold over global supply chains.
The gap isn’t about the number of factories. It’s about position. Influence in manufacturing means that if you stopped shipping tomorrow, your customers would feel it for a year. Most Indian factories, today, could be replaced in a quarter.
Assembly is a rental
India’s recent success stories are mostly assembly stories. Phones are the clearest example. Exports have grown sharply, and the industry deserves credit for building a base from almost nothing. But a large part of each phone’s value is imported components. Estimates of domestic value addition vary widely depending on the method used, so treat any single figure with caution. The direction is not in doubt, though. Assembly keeps the final step in India while the value, and the leverage, sits with whoever makes the display, the chip and the camera module.
Vietnam shows how this plays out. Its electronics exports are enormous, yet a good part of them comes from foreign-owned plants using imported parts. It has volume without much bargaining power. If a lead investor moves, the factories go with it.
Assembly still matters because it brings jobs, process discipline and a customer base. But it’s the first rung. A country that stops there is renting out floor space.
Pick chokepoints, not sectors
Here is the contrarian view. Most Indian industrial policy is written around sectors, such as electronics, solar modules, drones and toys, each with its own incentive scheme. The production-linked incentive programme covers 14 sectors with an outlay of roughly ₹2 lakh crore. That’s a lot of spread for a country that needs depth.
Influence comes from chokepoints, the specific inputs that other factories can’t run without. The useful question for any product is who makes the two or three things it can’t ship without, and whether that’s India.
On that test the record is mixed. India is a dominant supplier of generic formulations, and commonly cited estimates put it near 40 percent of US generic prescriptions by volume. Yet many of the key starting materials and intermediates behind those drugs come from China. Early in the pandemic India restricted exports of certain active ingredients, and the episode showed both how much leverage it held and how thin the base underneath was. A pharma exporter that depends on one country for its raw materials has volume, but the power belongs to its supplier.
The same pattern shows up in specialty chemicals, solar cells and wafers, rare earth magnets, machine tools and battery materials. From the importing side of a chemical business, it’s easy to see where substitution is impossible. An intermediate that costs 3 percent of the final product’s value can stop a whole line if it doesn’t arrive.
That is where India should aim. Not another assembly line for something finished, but the unglamorous middle of the chain. It’s less photogenic than a gleaming electronics plant, and it’s where leverage lives.
The cost problem is mostly upstream
Indian manufacturers often blame logistics. For years the figure of 13 to 14 percent of GDP was quoted as the country’s logistics cost. A more recent estimate based on NCAER work puts it closer to 8 to 9 percent. The two methods differ, and I’d treat the gap as unresolved. Either way, my read is that logistics gets more blame than it deserves, because the larger penalties come earlier in the chain.
Consider tariffs on inputs. For years India taxed raw materials and intermediates more heavily than finished goods. This created inverted duty structures where a manufacturer paid more for inputs than the importer of the finished product paid in duty. Quality control orders compounded this. They were meant to keep poor quality out, but in several materials they limited the supplier choices of downstream users and pushed up input prices. The government has rolled back a number of these orders since late 2025, which is the right direction, though the exact list is worth checking against current notifications.
Add the cost of capital, the time spent on approvals and the variation in state-level rules, and a pattern appears. The Indian factory floor is rarely the problem. The costs arrive at the gate before production starts. A policy that cut input duties and compliance time would do more for competitiveness than another subsidy for a finished product.
The missing middle
India has plenty of very small firms and a handful of very large groups. It has few firms in between that are big enough to serve a global OEM, yet nimble enough to take on tough specifications. Taiwan and South Korea built influence with exactly this layer. Contract manufacturers and component specialists grew up alongside the final-goods brands and became suppliers the whole world relied on.
India’s labour codes came into force in November 2025, which removes one reason firms stayed small to avoid regulatory thresholds. How much that matters will depend on how states write their own rules, and on whether land and power become easier to get. A firm that needs three years to open a plant won’t win a contract that expires in two.
Public procurement can help too. Government buyers in railways, defence, power and health place orders large enough to carry a supplier through the years it takes to qualify with a foreign customer. If those orders are structured to reward quality and delivery record rather than the lowest bid alone, they’ll produce the mid-sized exporters India lacks.
Trade deals and carbon rules are factory policy
India has signed an agreement with the UK, put in place a trade pact with the EFTA states, and concluded negotiations with the EU in early 2026. Check the current implementation status of each before planning around it. These deals open doors, but they don’t walk exporters through. What matters is whether a factory can meet the standards on the other side.
For chemical exporters, that means registration and compliance under Europe’s REACH rules, which is slow and expensive. For steel, aluminium, cement and fertiliser, it means the EU’s carbon border mechanism, which entered its definitive phase in 2026. Exporters will need verified emissions data for each shipment or pay for the gap. A firm that can document its emissions will hold a pricing edge over a rival that can’t. Few Indian mid-sized plants have started measuring.
This is where policy and factory practice meet. The government can fund testing labs, shared compliance support and recognition of Indian certification. Firms have to do their own measuring.
What does it signify?
For policymakers
Rank products by chokepoint value rather than by sector fashion. Cut duties on intermediates that have no domestic producer. Review every quality control order against one question, which is whether it protects a user or a producer. Publish a yearly figure for domestic value addition in the top 20 export products, so the debate runs on one measure.
For factory owners
Run the replacement test on your order book this week. For each major customer, estimate how long it would take them to replace you, and what it would cost them. If the answer is under six months, you’re a vendor. Then choose one product where you could become the only qualified Indian source, and invest in the certification, testing and documentation that a foreign buyer needs before it will place a first order. Start measuring emissions per tonne now, whatever your sector.
For investors and buyers
Look past assembly volumes. Ask what share of the bill of materials is made in India, who supplies the rest, and whether the company holds any qualification that took a rival years to obtain. Firms with long customer qualification cycles tend to keep their customers.
The test for national progress is just as simple. When a foreign buyer lists the five suppliers it can’t do without, India should appear on that list for more than one product. Today, for most products, it doesn’t.

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